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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-4025 
______ 
 
OMAR OBD GOMAA ORABI,  
a/k/a OMAR GOMMA ORABI 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
______ 
 
 
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(File No. A072-759-091) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter Durling. 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, GARTH, and SLOVITER Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 2, 2014) 
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Omar Obd Gomaa Orabi 
Moshannon Valley Correctional Center 
555 Geo Drive 
Philipsburg, PA 16866 
 Petitioner Pro Se 
 
Sharon M. Clay, Esq. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
Timothy B. Stanton, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner, Omar Abd Gomaa Orabi, appeals from an 
order of removability, entered by the Honorable Walter 
Durling, U.S. Immigration Judge (“IJ”), on May 22, 2012, 
and approved by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
on September 18, 2012.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the decision of 
the IJ and BIA. 
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I 
 Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the United 
States in 1990 and became a lawful permanent resident 
without conditions in 1996.  In 2010, he was convicted in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(“S.D.N.Y.”) for the offenses of Conspiracy to Commit Fraud 
in connection with Access Devices, Possession of Counterfeit 
Access Devices, Possession of Counterfeit and Forged 
Checks, and Aggravated Identity theft.  He was sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of 70 months.  In November 2011, the 
District Court amended its judgment and recalculated Orabi‟s 
sentence; however, Orabi was still sentenced to a term of 70 
months.  He appealed that order to the Second Circuit in 
December 2011, and that appeal remains pending.  See 
United States v. Ibrahim (Orabi), C.A. No. 12-0044 (2d Cir., 
filed Dec. 29, 2011). 
 In February 2012, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against 
Orabi.  Among other things, DHS charged that Orabi was 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his 
S.D.N.Y. conviction was for an aggravated felony.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Orabi notified DHS and the 
Immigration Court that he was appealing the S.D.N.Y. 
conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the aggravated 
felony removal charge.  At a subsequent removal hearing, 
Orabi appeared pro se and took part in an ambiguous 
exchange with the IJ regarding the status of the Second 
Circuit appeal.  At the IJ‟s request, Orabi also agreed to 
provide a letter that ostensibly withdrew his Second Circuit 
appeal.  DHS therefore moved to reinstate the removal 
charge, and the IJ sustained it.   
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 The appellate record of the Second Circuit reveals 
neither the letter, which ostensibly withdrew Orabi‟s appeal, 
nor any motion by Orabi to withdraw the appeal.
 1
  Indeed, 
after a thorough examination of the docket sheet of the 
Second Circuit, it appears that Orabi‟s appeal from his 
S.D.N.Y. conviction is still awaiting disposition by the 
Second Circuit. 
 We make reference to the record of the Second Circuit 
because it is that record that is controlling regarding the 
documents received and matters affecting the appeal of a 
litigant.  Moreover, absent any proof of actions, documents, 
affidavits, or similar submissions that might contradict the 
record, it is the record that governs.  See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We believe 
that a certified docket sheet is adequate, absent some 
contradictory evidence by the defendant, to establish the 
existence of a prior conviction for this sentencing purpose” 
(citing United States v. Dickens, 879 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 
1989)); Brainerd v. Beal, 498 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(“[T]he district court‟s docket cannot be impeached by 
affidavit” (citing Wall v. United States, 97 F.2d 672 (10th 
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938))).  Here, as we 
have indicated, the record is devoid of any such submissions 
by Orabi.  Hence, we regard Orabi‟s appeal of his criminal 
                                              
1
 We may take judicial notice of the contents of another 
Court‟s docket.  See, e.g., Mar. Elec. Co., Inc. v. United 
Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1200 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); Porter 
v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2010); Singh v. 
U.S. Dep‟t of Homeland Sec., 526 F.3d 72, 80 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
2008); see also F.R.E. 201(b).  But see Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 
378 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds 
by Nbaye v. Attorney General, 665 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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conviction as still extant and therefore viable.  We credit 
Orabi‟s appeal to the BIA, where he has argued that his 
Second Circuit appeal has never been withdrawn. 
 While Orabi argued on appeal to the BIA that his 
convictions were not final for immigration removal and that 
the IJ‟s removal order was void, the BIA nevertheless held 
that his conviction remained final for immigration purposes.  
The BIA stated: 
[U]nder section 101(a)(48)(A) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A), the term “conviction” means 
“a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered 
by a court.” Whether such judgment may be 
subject to direct appeal is immaterial to the 
attachment of immigration consequences. See, 
e.g., Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 
2012)
2
. . . .  The Immigration Judge therefore 
properly considered the immigration 
consequences of [Orabi‟s] conviction. 
                                              
2
 The citation provided by the BIA for Planes v. Holder, 686 
F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2012), is actually a citation to a 
concurrence in an order denying rehearing en banc by the 
Honorable Sandra S. Ikuta, a Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals Judge.  The dissent in that order was written by the 
Honorable Stephen R. Reinhardt, U.S. Court of Appeals 
Judge.  We discuss his reasoning in text infra.  The citation to 
the initial panel decision denying Planes‟s petition is Planes 
v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2011), authored by Judge 
Ikuta. 
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Accordingly, the BIA dismissed Orabi‟s appeal.3   
On August 12, 2013, the Government filed a letter 
brief stating that: (1) Orabi had been deported to Egypt; (2) 
despite Orabi’s deportation, we retained jurisdiction; and (3) 
the Government was prepared to return Orabi to the United 
States pursuant to Immigration Control Enforcement (“ICE”) 
regulations.  See ICE Policy, § 11061.1(2) (“Absent 
extraordinary circumstances, if an alien who prevails before 
the U.S. Supreme Court or a U.S. [C]ourt of [A]ppeals was 
removed while his or her [petition for review] was pending, 
ICE will facilitate the alien‟s return to the United States if 
either the court‟s decision restores the alien to lawful 
permanent resident (LPR) status, or the alien‟s presence is 
necessary for continued administrative removal 
proceedings.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A) (requiring 
an immigrant‟s presence at a removal hearing absent the 
parties‟ consent or a telephonic or video conference).   
Orabi now petitions pro se before us for review.  
Whether we have jurisdiction is the crux of his appeal from 
the BIA.  The answer to this question depends on whether the 
S.D.N.Y. conviction, which is on appeal to the Second 
Circuit, was a final judgment for immigration purposes. 
II 
                                              
3
 Orabi also submitted to the BIA a copy of a Second Circuit 
order dated July 16, 2012 granting his motion for an 
extension of time in his criminal appeal.  The BIA noted that 
the order constituted new evidence but held that the pendency 
of a criminal appeal was immaterial to Orabi‟s immigration 
proceedings.  
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Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) provides that “no 
court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of 
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of 
having committed [certain] criminal offense[s],” 8 U.S.C.            
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) grants us jurisdiction to review 
“constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a 
petition for review” of final removal orders.  Paredes v. Att‟y 
Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); Papageorgiou v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review 
questions of law de novo, Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 
162 (3d Cir. 2007), but we “will not disturb the IJ‟s 
credibility determination and findings of fact if they are 
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence 
on the record considered as a whole.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 
338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Whether Orabi‟s conviction was final for 
immigration purposes despite the pendency of his appeal to 
the Second Circuit is a question of law subject to plenary 
review.  See Henry v. Bureau of Immig. & Customs 
Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2007).   
III 
The Government offers three arguments in support of 
its position that Orabi‟s conviction was final for immigration 
purposes: (1) the record supports the Agency‟s finding that 
Orabi withdrew his appeal to the Second Circuit; (2) Orabi‟s 
conviction was final regardless of whether his appeal was 
withdrawn because his appeal only challenged his sentence 
and not the finding of his guilt; and (3) this Court should 
adopt the position of its sister Circuits and the BIA that a 
conviction is final for immigration purposes regardless of 
whether a direct appeal is pending. 
8 
 
A 
We have already discussed supra why the 
Government‟s position as to the withdrawal of Orabi‟s appeal 
cannot prevail.  Based on the Second Circuit record, Orabi 
had – and has – a pending appeal before that Court.  See 
Fiadjoe v. Att‟y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Additionally, the BIA did not base its decision on its finding 
that Orabi did not have a pending appeal, but rather on its 
determination that a conviction is final for immigration 
purposes regardless of whether a direct appeal is pending.  
See AR 3 (citing Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc)). 
B 
The Government‟s argument regarding the 
sentence/conviction distinction and the contents of Orabi‟s 
Second Circuit appeal is similarly unavailing.  Because the 
BIA did not reach its decision based on this ground, we may 
not affirm the judgment on this ground.  See Sec. & Exch. 
Comm‟n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] 
reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment 
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, 
must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds 
invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or 
improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative 
action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate 
or proper basis.”); Li v. Att‟y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (noting that a court cannot affirm an agency 
decision on a ground upon which the agency did not rely). 
C 
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Thus, we turn to the Government‟s concluding 
argument concerning the finality for immigration purposes of 
the Second Circuit appeal from Orabi‟s criminal judgment of 
conviction.   
Prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), it was 
“well established that a conviction does not attain a sufficient 
degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct 
appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or 
waived.”  In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (BIA 
1988) (citing Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.1975); Will 
v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.1971)); see also Planes, 686 
F.3d at 1037 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (citing “the longstanding rule that a 
conviction is not final for immigration purposes until the 
immigrant has exhausted or waived his direct appeal as of 
right”). 
The IIRIRA defined the term “conviction,” for 
purposes of immigration removal as: 
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a 
court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, 
where . . . (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty 
or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some 
form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien‟s 
liberty to be imposed.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).   
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 Thus, the IIRIRA‟s amendment, which focuses solely 
on the term “conviction,” sought to broaden the scope of that 
term, but in so doing, it did not refer to, amend, change, or 
even mention doing away with the need for appeal to acquire 
finality of judgment.  Understandably, Section 322, as 
recalled in the Conference Committee Report of the House of 
Representatives, addressed only adjudications that were 
“deferred” (a product of numerous state procedures) and 
instances in which the subject alien has violated a term or 
condition of probation.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828, 104th 
Cong., 2nd Sess.1996, 1996 WL 563320 at *496-97.  In those 
cases, the IIRIRA amendment was designed to correct “a 
myriad of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a 
conviction” by giving effect to the “original finding or 
confession of guilt . . . to establish a „conviction‟ for purposes 
of the immigration laws.”  Id. 
Consequently, following IIRIRA‟s passage, this 
Court‟s precedent governing the finality requirement in 
immigration removal cases remained undisturbed.  In Paredes 
v. Att‟y Gen., decided twelve years later than the amendment 
to the IIRIRA, we understandingly subscribed to the position 
that until such time as a direct appeal from a conviction that 
authorizes removal has been resolved, the judgment is not 
final for immigration removal purposes.  528 F.3d 196, 198 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Our jurisdiction for immigration removal 
purposes is therefore retained.
4
   
Other Courts, however, have held that a conviction is 
final for immigration purposes notwithstanding any pending 
                                              
4
 As we stated, the Government conceded in its August 12, 
2013 letter brief that despite Orabi‟s deportation, we retain 
jurisdiction. 
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appeals, without giving effect to the purpose of the IIRIRA.  
See, e.g., Planes, 686 F.3d at 1034 (Ikuta, J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (collecting cases).  
 We do not agree that the IIRIRA eliminated a direct 
appeal from the finality rule in its definition of conviction.  
Hence, we do not agree with those Courts that have adopted 
this interpretation.  See, e.g., id. (collecting cases).  By doing 
so, they have vitiated, without reason, the BIA‟s rule 
formulated and established in In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
546, 552 n.7 (BIA 1988).   
In Ozkok, the BIA held that “[w]here adjudication of 
guilt has been withheld, . . . further examination of the 
specific procedure used and the state authority under which 
the court acted will be necessary.”  19 I. & N. at 551 
(emphasis added).  The BIA went on to identify three 
elements that established a “conviction” in such settings: 
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or 
he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilty; 
(2) the judge has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person‟s 
liberty to be imposed (including but not limited 
to incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution, 
or community-based sanctions such as a 
rehabilitation program, a work-release or study-
release program, revocation or suspension of a 
driver‟s license, deprivation of nonessential 
activities or privileges, or community service); 
and 
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(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be 
entered if the person violates the terms of his 
probation or fails to comply with the 
requirements of the court‟s order, without 
availability of further proceedings regarding the 
person‟s guilt or innocence of the original 
charge. 
Id. at 551-52.  That is, “for immigration purposes, a deferred 
adjudication [as distinct from a pending appeal] would be 
considered a conviction if three elements were met, the third 
of which consisted of a finality requirement.”  Planes, 686 
F.3d at 1040 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).       
While Congress “adopted almost verbatim” this 
definition of “conviction” in the IIRIRA, id. at 1039, the 
statute explicitly eliminated the finality requirement for 
deferred adjudications.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A); see 
also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess.1996, 
1996 WL 563320 at *496-97.  Indeed, the Congressional 
Conference Committee Report accompanying IIRIRA refers 
only to a modification of the treatment of deferred 
adjudications: “This new provision, by removing the third 
prong of Ozkok, clarifies Congressional intent that even in 
cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or 
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a „conviction‟ for 
purposes of the immigration laws.”  Id. (emphasis added), 
quoted in Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1999)).  
Therefore, we agree with the Planes dissent that  
Nothing in IIRIRA or its legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended the phrase 
“formal judgment of guilt” to be interpreted any 
13 
 
differently from how it always had been 
interpreted prior to the enactment of the statute. 
. . .  The elimination of the finality provision for 
deferred adjudications, along with the failure to 
make any change in the language regarding 
direct appeals as of right . . . demonstrates 
Congress‟ intent to retain the finality rule for 
the latter category of appeals.  
 
686 F.3d at 1039-40 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
420, 434 (2000) (“When the words of the Court are used in a 
later statute governing the same subject matter, it is respectful 
of Congress and of the Court‟s own processes to give the 
words the same meaning in the absence of specific direction 
to the contrary.”).  
Given that Orabi‟s appeal was one of right and that no 
deferred adjudication is at issue here, we hold that the 
IIRIRA‟s elimination of the finality requirement in the case of 
deferred adjudications does not disturb the longstanding 
finality rule for direct appeals recognized in Ozkok and is 
irrelevant to the matter before us.   
Further, Ozkok, which states that “a conviction does 
not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration 
purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has 
been exhausted or waived,” 19 I. & N. Dec. at n. 7, is 
approvingly cited in Paredes as pertaining to a direct appeal 
as distinguished from a collateral appeal of a judgment, 528 
F.3d at 198.  Paredes, itself, involved a collateral appeal taken 
after the petitioner, Paredes, had suffered two state (New 
Jersey) convictions.  Paredes did not appeal the state 
14 
 
convictions but filed petitions for writs of coram nobis to 
challenge them.  Id.  We explained that a petition for a writ of 
coram nobis is not a direct appeal of a conviction but is 
rather a collateral attack on a conviction.  Id. (citing United 
States v. Gross, 614 F.2d 365, 368 (3d Cir. 1980)).  As such, 
and because Paredes‟s time to appeal directly had expired, we 
denied Paredes‟s petition.  Id. at 198-99.       
Accordingly, consistent with other Circuits, we do not 
retain jurisdiction for immigration purposes in our Court 
when a collateral appeal is taken from a criminal judgment 
adverse to a petitioner because it is not a direct appeal.  Id. 
(citing United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 
445-46 (6th Cir. 2004); Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 
(9th Cir. 1993); Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 
1982); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570-71 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Will, 447 F.2d at 533).   
Here, however, unlike the collateral challenge in 
Paredes, the criminal appeal awaiting resolution by Orabi is a 
direct appeal.  The IIRIRA amendment that speaks only to 
the term “conviction”5 cannot change the result of our 
analysis and reasoning in Paredes, despite the holdings of 
other Courts. 
Further, despite the Government‟s claims to the 
contrary, we do not read Planes as providing a consensus as 
to the correct interpretation of the IIRIRA‟s “finality rule.”  
As the Planes dissent correctly notes, “each of the cases cited 
by the panel is distinguishable, and only the one decided by 
the Tenth Circuit [United States v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 
791 (10th Cir. 2007)] purports to hold that a petitioner is not 
                                              
5
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
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entitled to a direct appeal as of right prior to being deported.”  
686 F.3d at 1039 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc).  See, e.g., Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 
1279, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2011) (denying petitioner‟s appeal 
where his collateral attack was pending);  Ramirez v. Holder, 
447 F. App‟x 249 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing the statements 
regarding finality in Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & 
Immig. Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 331-2 (2d Cir. 2007), as dicta); 
Abreu v. Holder, 378 F. App‟x 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating a 
decision by the BIA that the pendency of a late-reinstated 
appeal did not undermine the finality of an alien‟s 
conviction); Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d at 794 (addressing the 
definition of “conviction” in the context of a sentencing 
enhancement at a criminal re-entry proceeding as opposed to 
a removal hearing); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 
(7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (involving a collateral appeal and 
a petition of certiorari rather than a direct appeal); Griffiths v. 
INS, 243 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The INS was careful at 
oral argument to say that it was not taking the position it 
could deport someone adjudicated guilty while their appeal or 
appeal period was pending. . . .  Both the statutory language 
and the legislative history reflect a determination that a 
distinct mode of treatment for deferred adjudications is 
appropriate in this context”);  Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1001 
(holding only that the finality rule had been eliminated as to 
deferred adjudications, not as to direct appeals). 
We are therefore convinced that the principle 
announced and held in Ozkok – that “a conviction does not 
attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes 
until direct appellate review of the conviction has been 
16 
 
exhausted or waived”6 – is “is alive and well” in this Circuit 
and is correctly applied to Orabi as this Circuit‟s precedent. 
 The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, 
with instructions that the Government, pursuant to its August 
12, 2013 letter, be directed to return Orabi to the United 
States in accordance with the ICE regulations cited.
 
 
 
                                              
6
 19 I. & N. Dec. at 552 n.7.   
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SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 I agree with the majority that we have jurisdiction to 
consider Orabi‟s petition for review and that his appeal from 
a conviction on an aggravated felony is still pending before 
the Second Circuit.  I also agree that, prior to enactment of 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), P.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), 
the pendency of Orabi‟s direct appeal would have meant that 
his conviction was not final for immigration purposes and 
could not have been considered as a basis for removal.  I part 
company with the majority when it concludes that the 
pendency of Orabi‟s direct appeal means that the conviction 
cannot serve as a basis for removal following enactment of 
the IIRIRA.  That statute for the first time defined the term 
“conviction” for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA).  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (defining the term 
“conviction”).  Because this court did not address in Paredes 
v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
has not addressed in any other case, whether the finality 
requirement survived the IIRIRA‟s new definition of 
“conviction,” we are free to decide that issue now.  In my 
view, the plain text of the statutory provision defining 
“conviction” does not require the exhaustion or waiver of an 
alien‟s right to a direct appeal from a formal judgment of guilt 
before that conviction may serve as the predicate for an 
alien‟s removal.  Because I conclude that the pendency of 
Orabi‟s direct appeal no longer prevents his conviction from 
serving as the basis for his removal as an aggravated felon, I 
would deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 As the majority correctly notes, prior to the enactment 
of the IIRIRA, the term conviction was not defined in the 
immigration laws.  Under pre-IIRIRA case law, a conviction 
could not serve as the basis for removal until it had “attained 
a substantial degree of finality.  Such finality [did] not occur 
unless and until direct appellate review of the conviction . . . 
ha[d] been exhausted or waived.”  Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 
686, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing, inter alia, Pino v. Landon, 
349 U.S. 901 (1955)).  This “finality requirement,” as some 
courts have referred to it, was well established.  White v. INS, 
17 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1994) (referring to the “finality 
requirement,” which required the exhaustion or waiver of 
direct appellate review before a conviction occurred for 
immigration purposes); see also Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 
904 F.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990) (tracing “requirement of 
finality” to Supreme Court‟s decision in Pino); Morales-
Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(acknowledging that conviction on direct appeal is not final 
for immigration purposes); Aquilera-Enriquez v. INS,  516 
F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1975) (discussing Pino and finality for 
immigration purposes); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529, 533 (7th 
Cir. 1971) (same).  
As the states adopted various criminal procedures 
designed to “amelior[ate] the consequences of a conviction,” 
the finality requirement proved increasingly difficult to apply 
in the immigration context.
1
  In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
                                              
1
 The BIA explained in In re Ozkok that criminal “procedures 
var[ied] from state to state and include[d] provisions for 
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546, 550-51 (BIA 1988).  In Ozkok, the BIA revised its 
standard for a final conviction for purposes of the INA.  It 
addressed the features necessary for a conviction following 
(1) a judgment of guilt in the ordinary course of a criminal 
proceeding (formal adjudications), and (2) an adjudication of 
guilt that had been withheld (deferred adjudications).
2
  Id. at 
                                                                                                     
annulling or setting aside the conviction, permitting 
withdrawal of the plea, sealing the records after completion of 
a sentence or probation, and deferring adjudication of guilt 
with dismissal of proceedings following a probationary 
period.”  19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 550 (1988).  It further noted 
that these “ameliorative provisions” also varied in their 
applicability, with some being available to certain categories 
of offenders, such as youthful or first offenders.  Id. 
 
2
 Ozkok declared that  
 
As in the past, we shall consider a person 
convicted if the court has adjudicated him guilty 
or has entered a formal judgment of guilt. . . . 
Where adjudication of guilt has been 
withheld, however, further examination of the 
specific procedure used and the state authority 
under which the court acted will be necessary. 
As a general rule, a conviction will be found for 
immigration purposes where all of the 
following elements are present: 
(1) a judge or jury has found the 
alien guilty or he has entered a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
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551-53.  In a footnote, the BIA noted that “[i]t is well 
established that a conviction does not attain a sufficient 
degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct 
                                                                                                     
or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilty; 
(2) the judge has ordered some 
form of punishment, penalty, or 
restraint on the person‟s liberty to 
be imposed (including but not 
limited to incarceration, 
probation, a fine or restitution, or 
community-based sanctions such 
as a rehabilitation program, a 
work-release or study-release 
program, revocation or suspension 
of a driver‟s license, deprivation 
of nonessential activities or 
privileges, or community service); 
and 
(3) a judgment or adjudication of 
guilt may be entered if the person 
violates the terms of his probation 
or fails to comply with the 
requirements of the court‟s order, 
without availability of further 
proceedings regarding the 
person‟s guilt or innocence of the 
original charge. 
 
19 I. & N. at 551-52. 
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appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or 
waived.”  Id. at 552 n.7.    
It was against this backdrop that Congress enacted the 
IIRIRA in 1996.  The Act defined for the first time the term 
“conviction” for immigration purposes: 
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an 
alien, [(1)] a formal judgment of guilt of the 
alien entered by a court or, [(2)] if adjudication 
of guilt has been withheld, where— 
(i) a judge or jury has found the 
alien guilty or the alien has 
entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted 
sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilt, and  
(ii) the judge has ordered some 
form of punishment, penalty, or 
restraint on the alien‟s liberty to 
be imposed. 
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(48)(A). 
This new statutory definition, like the Ozkok decision, 
established the standard applicable to two categories of 
convictions:  formal adjudications and deferred adjudications.  
The question before us is whether this statutory definition 
incorporates a finality requirement akin to that found in pre-
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IIRIRA case law.  The majority answers that question in the 
affirmative; I disagree. 
Our task in interpreting a statute “is to discern 
legislative intent.”  Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  “Because we presume that Congress‟ intent is 
most clearly expressed in the text of the statute,” we examine 
“the plain language of the relevant provision.”  Reese Bros., 
Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2006); see 
also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) 
(instructing that the “first step” in interpreting a statute “is to 
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in 
the case”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Scrutiny of the IIRIRA definition of “conviction” 
reveals no language requiring the exhaustion or waiver of a 
direct appeal before an alien‟s conviction may serve as a 
predicate for removal.  Rather, the definition requires only 
that there has been  a “formal judgment of guilt of the alien 
entered by a court.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).  As to 
deferred adjudications, the definition demands a record that 
has expressly or implicitly established the alien‟s guilt, 
accompanied by the imposition of some restraint on the 
alien‟s liberty.  Id.  In the absence of statutory language 
specifying that a “conviction” under the IIRIRA requires the 
exhaustion or waiver of the right to appeal, I conclude that the 
pendency of a direct appeal does not preclude an alien‟s 
conviction from serving as the basis for removal. 
 Nor does Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), 
require a reading of the statute different from my own.  There, 
7 
 
the Supreme Court observed that “Congress is presumed to be 
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a 
statute without change.”  Id. at 580.  But that presumption is 
not applicable here.  First, Congress did not re-enact a 
statutory definition of the term “conviction.”  Instead, 
Congress carefully fashioned for the first time in the IIRIRA 
a definition of the term “conviction” for purposes of the INA.  
Second, the definition it enacted was a departure from the 
existing administrative standard set forth in Ozkok.  As I see 
it, congressional intent could not be more clear. 
Prior to the IIRIRA, Ozkok established the standard for 
formal and deferred adjudications.  Both of these categories 
required finality before a conviction could be the basis for 
removal of an alien.  Finality was required for formal 
adjudications by virtue of the finality requirement highlighted 
in the footnote in Ozkok.  19 I. & N. Dec. at 552. n.7.  Finality 
for deferred adjudications was necessary under the third 
prong set forth in the Ozkok standard.  Id. at 552. 
In fashioning the definition of the term “conviction” 
for immigration purposes, Congress embraced to a great 
extent the Ozkok definition for conviction.  Yet it stopped 
short of adopting the Ozkok standard in its entirety.  Instead, 
in setting out the definition of conviction for the two 
categories, Congress eliminated the third prong of the Ozkok 
standard for deferred adjudications.  That third prong had a 
finality requirement.  Id. (specifying that the deferred 
adjudication qualified as a conviction if it was “without 
availability of further proceedings regarding the person‟s guilt 
or innocence of the original charge”).  
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By choosing to eliminate the finality requirement for 
deferred adjudications in Ozkok, it stands to reason that 
Congress considered it for convictions as well.  Its 
elimination of the finality requirement for deferred 
adjudications resulted in a definition that demands treating 
formal and deferred adjudications in the same manner.  That 
is, neither formal nor deferred adjudications now require the 
exhaustion or waiver of a direct appeal before a conviction 
may serve as a basis for removal under the INA. 
Indeed, if Congress had intended to require a finality 
component in the first statutory definition of the term 
“conviction,” it could have easily included such a 
requirement.  Congress knows well, and knew at the time, 
how to refer to final convictions because it did so in other 
provisions in the INA concerning removal.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1227(a)(2)(D) (including among the class of criminal offenses 
making an alien deportable, certain miscellaneous offenses 
for which an alien “has been convicted (the judgment on such 
conviction becoming final)”); 1228(c)(3)(A)(iii) (providing 
that before a district court may enter a judicial order of 
removal at the time of sentencing against an alien who is 
deportable, there must be a valid waiver of the right to appeal, 
the expiration of the period to file a petition for review, or the 
final dismissal of an appeal from such a conviction); and 
1231(a)(4)(B)(i) & (ii) (authorizing Attorney General to 
remove an alien before he has completed a sentence of 
imprisonment if the confinement of the alien is “pursuant to a 
final conviction for a nonviolent offense”) (emphasis added).  
I rely on the well-settled proposition “that where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
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omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  I see no basis in the principles of statutory 
interpretation for importing the finality requirement in pre-
IIRIRA case law into the definition of “conviction” at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48(A).
3
 
II. 
The majority is of the view that Paredes v. Attorney 
General, 528 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2008), has already determined 
that the “finality requirement in immigration removal cases 
remained undisturbed” by the IIRIRA‟s definition of the term 
“conviction.”  Again, I disagree.  Paredes concerned whether 
a pending collateral attack negated the finality of a 
conviction for immigration purposes.  We agreed with our 
                                              
3
 The majority relies on legislative history.  Because the plain 
text of the statutory definition of “conviction” makes clear 
that exhaustion or waiver of the right to a direct appeal is not 
required, I do not address that aspect of the majority‟s 
reasoning.  See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 244 
(3d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that resort to legislative 
history is unnecessary “if a statute is clear on its face”); see 
also United States v. Gregg, 226 F.2d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“To determine a law‟s plain meaning, we begin with the 
language of the statute.  If the language of the statute 
expresses Congress‟s intent with sufficient precision, the 
inquiry ends there and the statute is enforced according to its 
terms.”). 
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sister courts of appeals that a pending collateral attack did not 
vitiate the finality requirement.  528 F.3d at 198-99.  Because 
the alien was seeking to set aside his conviction in a collateral 
attack proceeding, his conviction was indisputably final.  
There was no need, therefore, to address in Paredes whether 
the pendency of a direct appeal of a conviction post-IIRIRA 
precluded an alien‟s conviction from constituting a basis for 
removal.  Indeed, Paredes did not even acknowledge that 
Ozkok was decided pre-IIRIRA or that the IIRIRA had 
defined the term “conviction” for the first time for purposes 
of the INA.  Quite simply, Paredes is inapposite to the 
question before us.  
To be sure, as the majority acknowledges, there is no 
consensus among the courts of appeals as to whether there is 
a finality requirement post-IIRIRA for a conviction to 
constitute a basis for removal.  Some of our sister courts of 
appeals have concluded that there is no finality component in 
the new statutory definition of “conviction.”  Planes v. 
Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting alien‟s 
argument urging court to deviate from plain language of 
statute and to rely on case law predating enactment of a 
statutory definition of “conviction” and declaring that a 
“conviction” under  § 1101(a)(48)(A) “exists once the district 
court enters judgment, notwithstanding the availability of an 
appeal as of right”); Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1034 
(9th Cir. 2012) (concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) 
(concluding that the determination of whether an alien has a 
conviction is without regard to “whether appeals have been 
exhausted or waived”); Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 
1284 (10th Cir. 2011); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 
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1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Puello v. Bureau of 
Citizenship & Immig. Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 
2007) (observing that the IIRIRA “eliminate[d] the 
requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived 
before a conviction is considered final under the statute”); 
Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing 
that there was no indication that the finality requirement of 
Pino v. Landon “survive[d] the new statutory definition of 
„conviction‟ found in the IIRIRA”). 
Yet there are decisions which have rejected the 
contention that the finality requirement may no longer be a 
factor in deciding whether there is a basis for removal.  See 
Abreau v. Holder, 378 F. App‟x 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(remanding, despite Puello‟s observation, for the BIA to 
determine if the alien‟s conviction was sufficiently final for 
purposes of removal); see also Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 
1033, 1037, 1039 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (distinguishing the authority that 
purportedly holds that the finality requirement did not survive 
the enactment of the statutory definition of “conviction” in 
the IIRIRA).   
“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve on it.”  
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 
(1989).  I conclude that the statutory term “conviction” in the 
IIRIRA does not require the exhaustion or waiver of an 
alien‟s right to appeal a conviction before that conviction may 
qualify as a ground for removal.  Accordingly, the pendency 
of Orabi‟s direct appeal post-IIRIRA does not preclude his 
conviction from serving as the basis for his removal.  For that 
reason, I would deny Orabi‟s petition for review. 
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I respectfully dissent. 
